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Abstract  
The paper revisits the hypothesized direct linkages between two 
types of capital flows: external debt and capital flight. Do the 
linkages exist in the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand? The results indicate that, indeed, large sums of 
capital flowed in and out of these four countries in a revolving door 
manner. The implications of the results suggest the need for 
enhanced domestic management and international coordination in 
capital flows (i.e., external debt and capital flight) and the 
importance of sound domestic macroeconomic management and 
solid macro-organizational foundations. Finally, the results lend 
support to the case for challenging the legitimacy of a substantial 
portion of these countries’ external borrowings and the rationale for 
continuing to service such debts.  
 
1. Introduction 
Scholars have observed that capital has in fact been flowing out of 
the developing countries and going into the developed countries 
(see, e.g., Lucas 1990; Tornell and Velasco 1993; Alfaro et al. 2003; 
Epstein 2005). Even when there are capital inflows into the 
developing countries, most of the funds come increasingly in the 
form of portfolio and external borrowings. Still, the net flow 
remains out of the developing countries.  
External debt is an important concern to Southeast Asian countries. 
For instance, in the 1990s, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand all became vulnerable to debt-related crises, and 
experienced large-scale capital flight, especially in the late 1990s. 
But recent evidence shows that capital flight had already been 
significant in the region earlier on, even in the 1980s (see, e.g., 
Beja 2006). Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests that 
increased indebtedness is positively linked to increased intensity and 
frequency of debt-related economic cycles (see, e.g., Leung 2003). 
Mounting external indebtedness and the crises that it creates result 
in capital flight (see, e.g., Lessard and Williamson 1987; Boyce and 
Ndikumana 2001; Epstein 2005). In turn, the capital flight aggravates 
macroeconomic conditions, further inducing capital flight. The 
reality is that, today, capital flight persists, and that it has 
extraordinary impacts on economic growth and development.  
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In this paper, the linkages between external debts and capital flight 
are analyzed using a revolving door model. Briefly, this model posits 
direct and indirect linkages between external borrowing and capital 
flight. The first linkage posits some direct causal effects in which 
external debt provides the fuel and/or motivation for capital flight, 
and vice versa. External borrowings, for instance, are transformed – 
sometimes instantaneously – from capital inflows into capital flight, 
ultimately ending up abroad, say, as private foreign assets. At the 
same time, as external debts accumulate, the mounting burdens of 
debt servicing and the possibility of a debt default signal increased 
risks, motivating capital to flee. The causality can run in the reverse 
direction, as well. For example, as capital flees, it creates a 
financial vacuum, and the country in turn seeks external resources 
to fill the void. Or, in the case of flight-fueled external borrowing, 
money sent abroad is borrowed back. The overall result is a 
revolving process of capital flight and debt accumulation. In contrast 
to the first linkage, the second type of linkage – the indirect linkage 
– posits that capital flight and external borrowing occur because of 
overlapping sets of exogenous factors but not causally linked to each 
other. Macroeconomic mismanagement, for instance, can cause 
capital flight and external borrowing. Yet the indirect linkage 
suggests that the former does not cause the latter, and vice versa. 
The analysis that is presented in this paper using for the cases of 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, indeed, confirms 
a revolving door process between external borrowing and capital 
flight. 
The concept and measurement of capital flight are discussed in Part 
2 of the paper. Then, the concept of revolving door capital flows is 
discussed, followed by the empirics of the model. The analysis on 
why capital was fleeing Southeast Asia is presented in Part 5. 
Individual country results are presented and the section is concluded 
with a summary of key results. Implications are discussed. The last 
section of the paper concludes the discussions. 
 
2. Concept of Capital Flight 
Capital flight is not a new issue. Kindleberger (1987), for example, 
document capital flight from Europe and the United States in the 
early twentieth century and even earlier. In the 1930s, for instance, 
concerns about capital flight from Europe to the United States was a 
subject of debates, then also later at the Bretton Woods Meetings in 
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1944 (Helleiner, 1994). Even in recent decades, studies have 
documented capital flight from some Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (see, e.g., Gibson 
and Tskalotos 1993) – evidence that capital flight affects developed 
countries as well. 
But today, capital flight is a particularly important concern for 
developing countries for at least three reasons, the first being 
capital scarcity. Basically, capital flight aggravates the capital 
scarcity problem, but more importantly, it restricts the capacity and 
ability of the affected country to mobilize its domestic assets and 
access foreign resources. Consequently, capital flight retards 
economic growth and development and contributes to 
underdevelopment. 
A second reason is the ability of capital flight to induce a negative 
feedback process, especially during periods of crisis and uncertainty. 
As resource constraints become binding, economic growth is further 
limited. Then more capital flight could occur. There is also the 
possibility of being cut off from external sources of funds. 
Consequently, it becomes more difficult to implement economic 
policies, and improving the social conditions of people also becomes 
more difficult.  
A third reason is economic justice, particularly the distributive 
impacts of external indebtedness and capital fight, and the 
legitimacy of external debts. When the elite squander external 
debts, or external borrowings are inappropriately used to benefit 
only a few, it is the rest of society that suffers. More importantly, 
the economic and social costs of external indebtedness and capital 
flight are imposed on the majority. In addition, capital flight 
represents lost resources that could have been utilized in the 
domestic economy to generate additional output and jobs. Thus, 
ultimately, it represents lost opportunities. Therefore, when society 
as a whole does not benefit from external debts, questioning the 
legitimacy of such debts and the rationale for continuing to honour 
them becomes imperative.  
The recent interest in capital flight was triggered by the Latin 
American debt crisis in the 1980s. Back then, the two foci of 
research were as follows: scholars seeking to understand the 
relationship between capital flight and external debt, as capital 
flight undermined the ability of highly indebted countries to repay 
or service their mounting external debts (see, e.g., Lessard and 
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Williamson 1987); and scholars wanting to examine whether or not 
external borrowing in fact propels capital flight, and vice versa (see, 
e.g., Boyce 1992). 
After the debt crisis of the 1980s, capital flight became less of an 
issue. Capital started to flow back to developing countries, with the 
possible exception of Africa (see, e.g., Boyce and Ndikumana 2001; 
Collier, et al. 2001). Thus scholars stopped paying attention to 
capital flight. By the latter half of the 1990s, however, there was a 
resurgence of capital flight, as developing countries faced a greater 
number of intense financial and economic crises, making scholars 
interested in re-examining the issues. 
At least three arguments point to the need to study capital flight 
again. As in the past, external debts constitute the first reason. 
Country indebtedness remains a problem for developing countries, 
including the four Southeast Asian countries in this paper perhaps 
with the possible exception of Malaysia if a 50 percent threshold is 
used as benchmark (Table 1). Indeed, recent experience suggests 
that developing countries are again becoming vulnerable to debt-
related crises. The 1997–1998 Asian crises, for instance, were partly 
rooted in the accumulation of external debts, although they were 
private external debts. 
 
Table 1: Decadal Average of Shares of Total External Debt to GDP 
 
Source of data: World Bank (2005) 
 
Country 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
     Indonesia 0.47 0.27 0.61 0.93 
     Malaysia 0.12 0.27 0.35 0.47 
     Philippines 0.33 0.54 0.69 0.67 
     Thailand 0.14 0.26 0.33 0.65 
Region     
     Asia 0.21 0.29 0.38 0.47 
     Latin America 0.21 0.35 0.60 0.47 
     Africa 0.19 0.42 0.83 1.05 
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The second reason relates to changes in the economic policies 
adopted by or, in some cases, forced upon developing countries. In 
particular, neoliberal policies led to wide-scale and aggressive 
deregulation and financial liberalization without ensuring, or in 
some cases, neglecting the provision of appropriate governance 
structures and administrative capacities. The economic environment 
became more vulnerable to financial swings, crashes, crises, 
contagions, and economic stagnation. In fact, some scholars have 
argued that financial and economic crises are inevitable under such 
conditions (see, e.g., Palma 2003), more frequent (see, e.g., 
Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999), and lead to capital flight (see, e.g., 
Beja, Junvith and Ragusett 2005). The longer a country is in such a 
situation, and also the longer it postpones the re-introduction of 
governance structures and administrative capacity, the greater are 
the chances that financial and economic crises will occur. Also, 
when crises occur, they will be more intense and their social and 
economic costs will be very significant. Neoliberal policies have 
therefore made developing countries even more vulnerable to 
capital flight. Furthermore, given these developments, large and 
volatile capital flights will be common occurrences.  
A related issue in the context of the neoliberalization, especially 
financial liberalization and globalization, concerns the use of capital 
flight as a weapon against the policies of developing country 
governments that threaten, so to speak, the prerogatives of the 
elites and the powerful in their use of capital and resources. In this 
context, capital flight can be seen as a capital threat that would go 
on strike against any form of government intervention to manage 
capital and resources, say, into productive endeavours to benefit 
society at large in the long term. Thus, to what extent financial 
liberalization undermines the government’s policy space, or 
strengthens the capital threat, are critical dimensions to capital 
flight. What if the government simply wants to lower interest rates, 
target credit provisions, and so on, in order to realize full 
employment and raise social welfare? What if the government 
regulates capital flows to address external vulnerability and stabilize 
economic growth? In this context, capital flight necessarily includes 
a dimension of political economy, of class conflict, and concerns the 
State as a whole. 
A third reason for reconsideration is that capital flight means lost 
resources to the domestic economy, and therefore, lost 
opportunities. It is paradoxical that resources are flowing out of 
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developing countries rather than to them, although it is in 
developing countries that resources are most needed to generate 
economic growth and development. Even very poor countries have 
become net lenders to the rest of the world (see, e.g., Boyce and 
Ndikumana, 2001). Such lost resources do not contribute to the 
expansion of domestic economic activities or to the improvement of 
the social welfare of domestic residents. On the contrary, they 
imply foregone goods and services essential to sustaining economic 
growth. 
Moreover, capital flight can also mean lost resources for debt 
servicing, making the social burden of external debt heavier. Since 
in the developing countries institutions are weak, fragile or missing, 
the social and economic costs can be large and can affect many in 
society. And because capital flight is often undertaken by elites, the 
rest of society carries a disproportionate burden of the external 
debt. In fact, the elites are often able to avoid these costs because 
they can move abroad as well as transfer their wealth to safe 
havens.  
In short, the recent interest in capital flight stems from both old and 
new issues. Lessons from the past remain very relevant to the 
current context, but because of the new dimensions to the same 
problem, new lessons have to be learned. Hopefully, this paper 
contributes to that end.  
There is one point of clarification before continuing on with the 
discussion, and that is the difference between normal capital 
outflow and capital flight. Both these flows are movements of 
capital across countries. But their similarity stops there. Capital 
outflow represents a portfolio decisions typically undertaken to 
exploit favourable returns to capital, among other advantages. 
Capital flight, in contrast, represents a decision to take capital out 
and take refuge in another country in order to avoid social controls. 
Normal capital outflows are like two-way streets, where the traffic 
of capital goes in both directions and is presumably recorded in 
official statistics. Capital flight is more like a one-way street, in 
which the traffic is moving out and typically remains unrecorded. 
Sometimes, capital flight is financed by capital inflows. At other 
times, capital flight itself finances the capital inflows, returning in 
the guise of foreign investments to avail of the incentives extended 
to overseas investors. Hence, it is possible to have large volumes of 
capital flows across countries without any capital flight involved. It 
is also possible that even without capital inflows to a country, there 
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are still huge amounts of capital flight.  
Lastly, when this capital flow perspective is employed, there is at 
the outset a problem in understanding capital flight: the notion of 
an optimal portfolio allocation of capital precludes any unrecorded 
capital flows. In fact, in a two-way street capital flow system, there 
should not be any unrecorded flows, especially where the 
environment that has been deregulated and financially liberalized. 
Any movement of capital, no matter what the purpose is and the 
consequences to the economy, is considered legitimate and normal. 
If there are unrecorded capital flows, they are to be considered 
integral to the system that market processes can correct. 
Such a perspective ignores, and indeed does not see, the social and 
economic impacts of capital flight. These impacts can be significant, 
and are shouldered by the majority in society (i.e. the poor), and 
have long lasting impacts. Therefore, while both capital outflow and 
capital flight share a common feature, capital flight, in fact, has 
unique characteristics. It may be that affected countries take up 
policies that address capital flows in general but, at the same time, 
include policies that address capital flight itself. 
 
Defining and Measuring Capital Flight 
Capital flight is defined the movement of funds from resource-scarce 
developing countries to avoid social controls. Resource scarcity 
means the lack of financial capital and infrastructural 
underdevelopment, with infrastructure encompassing both physical 
and social capitals. A country with a low level of infrastructural 
development is constrained to attract external funds or unable to 
fully exploit the potentials of additional resources and is likely to 
remain a resource-scarce country. Social control is the actual or 
potential (including formal and informal) regulations on resources. 
The definition raises fundamental problems: there are many ways to 
operationalize capital flight, and consequently, result in different 
estimates (see, e.g., Beja 2005). In this paper, capital flight (KF) is 
measured using the residual method; that is, net unrecorded capital 
outflow, or the residual between officially recorded sources and 
uses of funds. Recorded sources of funds are net additions to 
external debt (CDET) and net non-debt creating capital inflows 
(NKI). NKI is the sum of net foreign direct investments (FDI), net 
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portfolio investment equities plus other investment assets (PORT). 
Recorded uses of funds are the current account deficits (CAD) and 
the accumulation of international reserves (CRES). Equation 1a 
includes the relevant foreign exchange flows, thus 
(1a) KF = CDET + NKI – CAD – CRES.  
Positive KF means capital flight, while negative KF means “reverse” 
capital flight. As in the literature, KF has a positive notation 
because capital flight is a form of foreign assets accumulation (see, 
e.g., Vos 1992). Other transactions like illegal capital flight and 
money laundering can not be measured. In addition, capital flight 
can take place within normal processes like the banking system, 
which makes a complete estimation impossible. Still, Equation 1a 
obtains an indicative measure of the magnitude of capital flight. It is 
prima facie evidence of capital flight. 
Data used in the calculations have errors, and so adjustments are 
needed. The first set of adjustments concerns the financial 
accounts. In particular, an adjustment is needed when external 
debts were misrecorded and/or when central banks make 
corrections on the data. Also, an adjustment is needed to account 
for the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on the stock of external 
debt (DEBT). Long-term external debts (LTDEBT) are normally 
denominated in hard currencies, and exchange rate fluctuations 
affect the US dollar (US$) values of debts, in turn, affect CDET. A 
way to calculate the beginning-of-year adjusted external debt 
(ATTD) that accounts for the foreign exchange rate fluctuations is 
as: 
(2)  
        , 
where αi is the proportion of long-term debts in Euros (EU), British 
pounds (UK), French francs (FF), German marks (DM), Japanese yens 
(Yen), and Swiss francs (SF); βi is the proportion of LTDEBT in US$, 
multiple, and other currencies; FX is the exchange rate of the hard 
currencies to US$; IMF is use of IMF credits; SDR is the exchange rate 
between Special Drawing Rights and US$; and STDEBT is short-term 
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external debt. Subscript -1 denotes the end of last year (hence, the 
beginning of the current year).  
All things the same, an appreciation in a hard currency relative to 
US$ reduces FXi/FXi,-1 so, too, ATTD-1, and DEBT must be smaller. 
The adjustment factor is thus, 
(3) ADEBT = ATTD-1 – DEBT-1.             
If the Japanese yen appreciates relative to US$, all things being 
equal, ATTD-1 must be smaller, and ADEBT must be negative. CDET 
becomes an inaccurate estimate of the net additions to external 
indebtedness. The change in the adjusted external debt (CDETADJ) is: 
(4a) CDETADJ = CDET – ADEBT.        
Since CDET = DEBT – DEBT-1, it can be shown that Equation 4a is 
equal to: 
(4b) CDETADJ = DEBT – ATTD-1.       
Likewise, adjustments are needed to account for the discrepancies 
in the recorded foreign direct investments (FDI) and portfolio 
equities investments plus other investment assets (PORT). Also, the 
impact of the foreign exchange fluctuations on FDI and PORT are 
calculated. The procedure is similar to that of CDETADJ. After the 
discrepancies in the FDI and PORT data between source-country and 
host-country are determined, the impacts of the foreign exchange 
fluctuations on FDI and PORT are calculated. Thus the adjusted 
CDET (CDETADJ) and the adjusted PORT (PORTADJ) are obtained, and 
thus the adjusted NKI (NKIADJ). Equation 1a is re-estimated as 
follows: 
(1b) KFADJ = CDETADJ + NKIADJ  – CAD – CRES.     
The second set of adjustments to Equation 1a concerns the current 
accounts. An adjustment is needed to account for trade 
misinvoicing. Import overinvoicing and export underinvoicing are 
typical avenues for capital flight. Import underinvoicing (or 
technical smuggling) is exploited to evade customs duties and trade 
regulations, but conceptually, it is a form of reverse capital flight in 
that unrecorded flows of foreign exchange occur. “Pure” (as 
opposed to technical) smuggling in which imported goods are not 
taxed or recorded at all can be captured by trading-partner data 
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comparison. Export overinvoicing can happen if there are incentives 
on export performances that result in invoice padding. In any of 
these cases, the trade balance is inaccurate. 
The magnitude of trade misinvoicing is obtained by comparing trade 
data between trade partners. The first step in the procedure is to 
compute export misinvoicing (DX) and import misinvoicing (DM) for a 
country in its trade with major industrialized-country trade 
partners,  
(5a) DX = PX – CIF * X,       
  
(5b) DM = M – CIF * PM,        
where PX is the industrialized-country trade partner’s imports from 
country-i, and PM is the industrialized-country trade partner’s 
exports to country-i; X and M are country-i’s exports to and imports 
from industrialized-country trade partners, respectively; and CIF is 
an adjustment for the cost of freight and insurance. Positive values 
of DX mean net export underinvoicing and negative values mean net 
export overinvoicing. Positive values of DM mean net import 
overinvoicing and negative values mean net import underinvoicing.   
To estimate the global export and import trade discrepancies of 
country-i (MISX and MISM, respectively), DX and DM are multiplied 
with the reciprocals of the shares of all industrialized-country trade 
partners to country-i’s total exports (X_INDUS) and total imports 
(M_INDUS), respectively: 
(6a)     
(6b)      
Then MIS is obtained as the sum of MISX and MISM, and it added to 
CAD. 
When developing countries have sizeable overseas workers, income 
remittances (REM) become significant items in their current 
accounts. When informal remittances are substantial, an adjustment 
on CAD is needed. Unrecorded income remittances (UNR) is 
INDUS_X
DX
MISX =
INDUS_M
DM
MISM =
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calculated using REM and an index for informal remittances (UNRI); 
that is,  
(7) UNR = REM * UNRI;        
and it is added to CAD. The calculated adjustments (MIS and UNR) 
obtain the adjusted CAD (CADADJ). 
Finally, adjustments on CRES may be obtained, covering the impact 
of foreign exchange fluctuations on the dollar valuations of the 
international reserves and other asset holdings (e.g., gold) of the 
central bank. 
(1c) KFADJ = CDETADJ + NKIADJ – CADADJ – CRESADJ,    
which is called total capital flight (TKF). Real capital flight (RKF) is 
calculated next using the United States producer price index (PPI) in 
1995 prices, as deflator, 
(8) .     
The relative burden of RKF is,  
(9) ,      
where RGDP is gross domestic product in 1995 prices.  
 
3. Concept of the Revolving Door 
In conventional analysis, capital scarcity is supposed to result in 
capital inflow. This situation occurs because the expected returns to 
capital are higher in places where at the margin it is scarce. By 
definition, capital is scarce in developing countries so we expect 
capital to flow to them. Typically, this process is facilitated by an 
attractive positive rate of return to capital. As capital scarcity 
becomes less of a constraint, the returns to capital decrease and its 
flow is expected to slow down. Eventually, capital will move to 
other places where the returns are relatively higher. In other words, 
market processes will ensure that capital is appropriately allocated 
PPI
TKF
RKF =
RGDP
RKF
RKFGDP =
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between areas where it is plenty and areas where it is scarce. 
Following this logic, the following hypothesis can be made: high 
rates of return to capital in a country decrease capital flight. 
Conventional analysis also suggests that capital will flow to where it 
is most needed or desired; that is, to where it will be relatively 
more productive. As such, when a country is experiencing robust 
economic expansion, investments (both domestic and foreign) are 
pulled into the country to further fuel economic growth. Capital 
inflows help to sustain that robust economic growth, but eventually 
diminishing returns and decreasing returns to capital should be 
expected. As long as the economy enjoys relatively higher returns to 
capital than do other places, however, investments will continue to 
flow in. The converse applies as well. Therefore a hypothesis can be 
as follows: high and sustained economic growth within a country 
decreases capital flight.  
Recent empirical studies challenge this conventional analysis. In 
fact, the evidence suggests that the direction of capital flows is 
often in reverse; that is, capital is moving away from the developing 
countries. When capital does flow to developing countries, it 
subsequently flows out as capital flight, thus a strong and positive 
correlation exists between the capital flows. Thus, the revolving 
door model of capital flight is an attempt to address this puzzle. The 
model posits direct and indirect linkages between capital flight and 
external debt  
 
Indirect linkages 
One class of explanations posits only an indirect linkage between 
capital flight and external debt, with the contention that some 
overlapping sets of exogenous factors cause both capital flight and 
external borrowing. Capital flight occurs not because of capital 
inflows or external debt per se, but rather because of, say, 
macroeconomic mismanagement. In similar fashion, developing 
countries are (now highly) indebted not because of capital flight 
but, again, because of macroeconomic mismanagement. Policy 
mistakes, corruption, rent-seeking behaviour, weak domestic 
institutions, and the like, will induce capital flight and cause 
external debt problems. Another contention is that capital inflows 
(especially during surges of capital flows) lead to risky or unsound 
investment decisions and over-borrowing. When governance 
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structures and mechanisms for administrative controls and 
prudential regulation are weak, fragile or missing, money borrowed 
from abroad can end up being pocketed by the domestic elite (and 
usually transferred into private accounts abroad), spent on 
conspicuous consumption, or allocated into showcase and 
unproductive development projects that do not generate foreign 
exchange to finance external debt servicing. So capital flight and 
external borrowing are manifestations and responses to 
unfavourable domestic economic conditions.  
The above explanation can be extended to include new dimensions 
among the indirect linkages, arising from recent developments in 
international finance, specifically, the impact of deregulation and 
financial liberalization on capital flight. In conventional analysis, 
economic reforms are expected to reduce capital flight. 
Accordingly, foreign savings will be made available to domestic 
entrepreneurs who, in turn, will use the cheap funds to build 
businesses, and create jobs and other infrastructure in the country. 
But such outcome is only possible when economic reforms are 
pursued with complementary governance structures and 
administrative capacity. When these structures are weak, fragile or 
missing, deregulation and financial liberalization will induce capital 
flight. Put in another way, deregulation and financial liberalization 
have not only enabled developing countries to have greater access 
to external capital, but have also led these countries (and firms) to 
take risky and unsound investment decisions and over-borrow. Such 
action can be mediated by asymmetric risk problems that favour 
international finance / investment over domestic finance / 
investment, especially with regard to the expropriation of capital 
and taxation. But the consequent economic and financial crises have 
only induced more capital flight and greater external borrowing. 
Furthermore, deregulation and financial liberalization in developed 
countries have unleashed large amounts of capital seeking new 
investment areas with attractive returns. The consequent increase 
in competition in the capital markets and the tendency towards 
short-term and rapid investments have created an economic 
environment prone to financial swings, crises, contagions, and 
economic stagnation. While it may be true that some developing 
countries have benefited from increased capital inflows (i.e., 
availability of external savings), they have also found it more 
difficult to manage their economies, as capital comes in and leaves 
rather quickly. In the end, we find that developing countries 
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experience frequent and severe financial and economic crises, as 
demonstrated in the 1990s. In turn, we argue that capital flight has 
increased during the period of deregulation and financial 
liberalization. The hypothesis then is: deregulation and financial 
liberalization increase capital flight and external borrowing. 
The discussion above implies that there is a supply-and-demand 
dimension underlying the indirect linkages to capital flows or 
external debt, and by extension, there is also a supply-and-demand 
dimension to capital flight and external borrowing. This situation 
suggests that the effective management of both demand and supply 
of capital is needed to reduce capital flight. We argue that in a 
context where the institutions of governance and administrative 
capacity are weak, fragile, or missing, deregulation and financial 
liberalization will result in greater economic vulnerability and 
intense financial and economic crises, while governments become 
ineffective, or unable to respond. In fact, McKinnon (1991) 
presciently warned that embarking on premature deregulation and 
rapid financial liberalization of capital flows will result in 
unwarranted capital flight or unwarranted indebtedness, or both. 
The indirect linkages to capital flight would therefore be stronger in 
the presence of weak, fragile or missing governance structures and 
administrative capacity. Capital flight occurs because the prevailing 
conditions allow it. In this framework, sound institutions and the 
pursuit of reforms in the proper manner, will reduce economic risk, 
sustain economic growth, and reduce capital flight. 
While the indirect linkages may help explain a cross-sectional 
correlation between capital flight and external borrowing, it 
remains to be explained why there is often a close year-to-year 
correlation between capital flight and external debt and why, in 
some cases, capital flight tends to be persistent. The tight 
correlation between the current flows suggests a direct linkage. And 
the correlation between current and past capital flight, and 
between current and past borrowing, suggests persistence or 
hysteresis.  
 
Direct linkages 
The direct linkages between capital flight and external debt have 
two directions. In the first, external debt provides the fuel or is the 
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driver of capital flight; that is, capital inflow has a “liquidity” (or 
fuel) effect, while its accumulation has a “stock” (or driver) effect. 
The reverse link posits that capital flight creates the fuel or is the 
driver of borrowing; that is, capital flight (again) has a short-run 
“liquidity” effect but, as it persists, also has a “stock” effect.  
 
External Debt Linked to Capital Flight  
The argument that external debt fuels capital flight acknowledges 
the fact that loan proceeds can be “transformed” from capital 
inflow to capital flight. In this case, external debt provides the 
resources or funds for capital flight. Such funds could create 
conditions for capture as “loot” that individuals (often the elite) 
appropriate as their own. In fact, the (captured) funds may not even 
enter the country at all. Instead only accounting entries are done in 
the respective accounts of financial institutions. 
An important aspect of debt-fuelled capital flight is the process of 
debt “layering” between the lender and the borrower in whose 
name the external debt is acquired. There is an asymmetry between 
the identity of the borrower and the liability holder, which is the 
public. Private external debts, for example, enjoy government 
guarantees that effectively transform them into public debt (i.e., 
publicly guaranteed private debts). Because of debt guarantees, 
lenders become overconfident and facilitate the provision of funds. 
At the same time, the guarantees effectively absolve the borrower 
of the responsibility of repaying the external debt in the event of a 
default. Precisely because of debt guarantees, borrowers become 
very eager to acquire external debts. In other words, such 
arrangements simultaneously create incentives for over-borrowing 
and over-lending.  
Potentially, therefore, all types of external borrowing are 
transferable as capital flight. Lenders are partly responsible for 
capital flight in developing countries insofar as they collude, 
indirectly or directly, with individuals who channel loan proceeds 
into capital flight. As long as lenders continue to provide the funds, 
debt-fuelled capital flight will continue. It can be hypothesized that: 
an increase in capital inflows from external borrowing increases 
capital flight. 
The argument that external debt drives capital flight points to the 
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fact that debt-servicing problems eventually arise as debt 
accumulation goes out of hand. Thus the accumulation of external 
debt signals increased risks, to which capital holders respond by 
pulling out capital to avoid unfavourable developments. Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004) argue that a history of default, or a high potential 
of default, underpins much of the capital outflows from developing 
countries. As such, a past history of default compounds the risk 
associated with external debts and debt accumulation, and thus 
drives capital flight. The motivation for capital flight is to avoid the 
unfavourable developments due to a mounting stock of external 
debt. In this context, accumulated external debt has a “stock” 
effect on capital flight. 
Faced with difficulties in servicing large external debts, developing 
countries often go into a structural adjustment programme. There 
are various components to such programmes, among them: 
reductions in public expenditures, raised taxes, and a tight 
monetary policy to reduce aggregate demand. The usual outcome is 
slower economic growth, at least in the short run. The country 
becomes vulnerable in that unless it recovers and proceeds to 
sustained economic growth and development, it could regress into a 
worse situation. Often it is the latter that happens. In addition, 
there are significant social and political changes associated with 
structural adjustments, which can adversely affect overall economic 
stability. 
At the same time, greater external debt increases the demand for 
foreign exchange as debt servicing requirements increase. When 
demand reaches a point where international reserves are no longer 
adequate, a devaluation of the currency becomes inevitable. Like 
increasing taxes, a devaluation of the currency lowers the value of 
capital as well as the returns on investment. The country becomes 
vulnerable, too. Faced with increased risks, capital holders convert 
their domestic assets to foreign assets, reinforcing pressure on 
foreign reserves. Overall, capital flight is a mechanism to avoid 
unfavourable economic conditions engendered by external debt 
accumulation. Thus the hypothesis is: a higher total external 
indebtedness increases capital flight. 
Of the two linkages described above, debt-fuelled capital flight is 
contemporaneous with external borrowing, so they have a close 
year-to-year correlation. Debt-driven capital flight, on the other 
hand, has a lagged effect: it will not be contemporaneous with 
external borrowing, but a close correlation can be expected 
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between capital flight and external debt stock (see, e.g., Collier, 
Hoeffler and Patillo, 2001; Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003). The impact 
of the external debt stock on capital flight could be seen as 
reductions in international reserves. 
 
Capital Flight Linked to External Debt  
The second direction of linkages is flight-fuelled borrowing and 
flight-driven borrowing. Flight-fuelled borrowing takes place when 
capital is pulled out from a country and then re-enters the same 
country in the form of external debt or foreign investment. In this 
case, domestic capital is first converted into dollars, for example, 
and then deposited overseas; the depositor then takes a ‘loan’ from 
the same bank. In effect, this process conceals the source of the 
funds. It transforms capital that may have been acquired through 
inappropriate or dubious ways, into something legitimate. Also, 
flight-fuelled borrowing serves as a pretext for otherwise 
unexplained or “hidden” wealth. One crucial dimension of this 
process is that flight-fuelled borrowing sheds the national character 
of the capital; that is, domestic capital re-emerges as foreign 
capital. Freed of domestic social controls, it is able to enjoy the 
privileges extended to foreign capital. The hypothesis is: an increase 
in capital flight increases external borrowing. 
Flight-driven borrowing is a straightforward process. Capital flight 
drains domestic resources, thereby generating demand to replenish 
the lost funds. As long as external debts enjoy government 
guarantees, ostensibly precluding the possibility of a default, funds 
will flow to the country in response to this demand. Again, this 
process is a “stock” effect rather than a “liquidity” effect. It can be 
hypothesized that: an increase in the stock of capital flight 
decreases international reserves and increases external borrowing. 
Of the latter two types of linkages described above, flight-fuelled 
borrowing is contemporaneous with capital flight; hence they have a 
close year-to-year correlation. Flight-driven borrowing has a lagged 
effect, possibly exhibited as a reduction in international reserves; 
and so it is not contemporaneous with capital flight. Note that the 
net effect on international reserves depends on the magnitude of 
capital flight relative to external borrowing. 
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4. Empirics of the Revolving Door Model 
Empirical evidence suggests that there is a common set of 
determinants of capital flight and external borrowing. This 
observation is generally applicable in country and regional studies. 
For the revolving door model, evidence likewise suggests that 
capital flight and external debt have common determinants. These 
determinants can be grouped into three broad themes: (1) capital 
flows / external debt; (2) economic performance; and (3) politics 
and governance. The first theme covers the direct linkages of capital 
flight, while the latter two deal with are for the indirect linkages. 
Note that economic performance on the one hand, and politics and 
governance, on the other, are complex and difficult concepts to 
untangle. For the econometric analysis, four sets of specific 
indicators are needed, as follows: (1) capital inflows/external debt; 
(2) economic performance indicators; (3) rates of return to capital 
and risk; and (4) politics-governance-institutions indicators.  
 
Capital inflows / external debt 
Capital inflows and external debt are the most important variables 
explaining capital flight. This conclusion holds even using alternative 
specifications and estimation procedures. As for the revolving door 
model itself, the empirical evidence from the revolving door papers 
is strong especially for the fuel linkages, as it supports the 
contention that the causal relationships between external debt and 
capital flight run both ways and are strongly correlated year-to-
year. The empirical evidence is also robust for the drive linkage, 
especially for debt-driven capital flight. Ndikumana and Boyce 
(2003) even proposed that the reverse drive linkage could be 
verified using international reserves instead of the lags of external 
debt, but they were unable to obtain empirical support for this 
proposal. 
There are also alternative measures for capital inflows. The 
empirical evidence for such linkages appears dependent on the type 
of indicator used. Short-term capital flows tend to confirm the fuel 
linkage (see, e.g., Cuddington, 1987). International aid and grants 
seem to have a positive linkage to capital flight (see, e.g., Hermes 
and Lensink, 1992; Collier, Hoeffler and Patillo, 2003). But the 
evidence for foreign direct investment (FDI) is mixed. Kant (1998) 
and Harrigan, Mavrotas and Yusop (2000), for example, found a 
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negative linkage between FDI and capital flight; but Lensink, Hermes 
and Murinde (2000) and Collier, Hoeffler and Patillo (2001) did not 
obtain any statistically significant relationship. There is no revolving 
door paper that uses any of these alternative specifications. 
Trade flows have been used to proxy capital inflows, but the 
empirical results are mixed. Mikkelsen (1991) and Lensink, Hermes 
and Murinde (2000) found no linkage between total trade and capital 
flight. Smit and Mocke (1991), however, obtained a positive linkage 
between the current account balance and capital flight. When 
trade-related variables are found to be significant, the results are 
difficult to interpret. On one level, the results could suggest that 
there are available resources for capital flight; that is, there are 
“lootable” resources. On another level, the results could reflect the 
size of normal (capital) flows, so a large trade (or current account) 
balance would mean bigger trade financing, hence implying greater 
(official) capital movement. A more favourable trade balance could 
also lead to a reduced demand for external funds (i.e., external 
borrowing) as revenues from trade are now available for trade 
financing. Among the revolving door papers, Demir (2004), using the 
growth rate of the export-import ratio as a proxy for trade flows, 
obtained a positive link between capital flight and external debt, 
while Ndikumana and Boyce (2003), using total exports, got a 
positive linkage with capital flight alone.  
But there can be hysteresis in capital flight and external debt. 
Today’s capital flight could mean future capital flight; today’s 
external debt could mean future borrowing. One way to assess 
hysteresis is to determine whether or not the lags of capital flight 
(external debt) are statistically significant. Among the revolving 
door papers, only Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) found statistical 
evidence for capital flight hysteresis. 
 
Economic Performance Indicators 
Sound economic performance will suggest a robust and sustainable 
economy where capital is likely to be attracted and to remain. 
Consequently, we expect less capital flight from a country so 
characterised. 
Economic growth is a key indicator of economic performance. Pastor 
(1990) and Ndikumana and Boyce (2003), for example, found a 
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negative link between differential growth rates (i.e., a country’s 
own growth rate minus the foreign country’s growth rate) and 
capital flight. But when using only the country’s own growth rate for 
economic performance, the empirical evidence is actually mixed. 
Lensink, Hermes and Murinde (2000), for example, found a negative 
linkage between economic growth and capital flight, while Boyce 
(1992), Hermes and Lensink (1992), Chipalkatti and Rishi (2001), and 
Demir (2004) found no statistically significant relationship at all. As 
Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) explain, the country’s own growth rate 
is problematic in part because it is affected by some of the same 
factors that trigger capital flight. Isolating its independent impact 
on capital flight can be difficult.  
At the conceptual level, differential growth rates indicate the 
relative performance of economies, just as differential interest rates 
reveal the relative returns to capital (or investments). In this 
context, we think that the superior specification would be the 
differential growth rates. Among the revolving door papers, all 
except for Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) used the country’s own 
growth rate, and found no statistically significant relationship 
between economic growth and capital flight. 
An alternative economic performance indicator is growth of exports. 
Robust export performance typically implies robust economic 
growth, especially if an economy is organized around the export 
sector. Accordingly, robust export growth is expected to reduce 
capital flight. Most of the research on capital flight does not use 
export (or trade) growth rates. Among the revolving door papers, 
Demir (2004) used a similar indicator but obtained a positive linkage 
with capital flight, while Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) employed 
total exports but only to assess the presence of “lootable” 
resources.  
Yet another alternative indicator for economic performance is 
government budget deficit (or budget surplus). When there are large 
government budget deficits, the expectation is that government will 
acquire domestic debt or external debt, or both. On one level, the 
deficits could mean access to funds for capital flight; on another 
level, the deficits could signal macroeconomic mismanagement. If 
capital holders are unsure about how the budget deficits will be 
managed, or if they are unconvinced that the deficits will be 
managed well, they will pull out capital to avoid unfavourable 
developments. As such, budget deficits could have a positive lagged 
effect on capital flight. Alternatively, large government budget 
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deficits could mean that pump-priming activities are being 
undertaken to invigorate the economy, and if effective, will result in 
robust economic growth. As such, budget deficits could have a 
negative lagged effect on capital flight.  
The empirical evidence regarding budget deficit (budget surplus) is 
mixed. For example, Hermes and Lensink (1992) found no 
statistically significant relationship between budget deficit and 
capital flight. Boyce (1992) and Chipalkatti and Rishi (2001) did not 
find a statistically significant relationship either. Using government 
budget surplus, Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) obtained ambiguous 
statistical results. For the other revolving door papers, the empirical 
evidence was rather mixed. 
In addition to government budget deficits (or surpluses), another 
alternative measure is taxation. But this likewise suffers from 
possible dual interpretations, a problem analogous to those 
associated with the use of government deficits. For instance, when 
the government has a good tax revenue position, then there is no 
need for external borrowing, as there are available resources to 
finance public expenditure. In fact, the government would have 
funds to pay its debt obligations. But a good tax revenue position 
could also mean that the government is able to borrow more funds, 
because the ability to collect taxes (and the availability of 
resources) improves the government’s credit rating. Similarly, the 
desire to avoid taxes could be a motive for capital flight, but a 
strong tax collection capacity may signal government’s having a 
greater capability to detect and deter tax evasion (including capital 
flight).  
Pastor (1990) and Vos (1992) found no statistically significant 
relationship between taxes and capital flight. Hermes and Lensink 
(1992) obtained a positive linkage between the uncertainty of tax 
policy (i.e., tax variability) and capital flight. Ndikumana and Boyce 
(2003) argued that it may be problematic to characterize 
government performance using a single indicator, such as 
government budget deficit or taxation. But the more important 
problem is that data quality for taxes is often suspect, so empirical 
analysis would not reveal the true relationship between the 
indicator and capital flight. None of the revolving door papers uses 
taxes or uncertainty of tax policy as an indicator.  
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Rates of return and risk indicators 
Low rates of return to capital would push or repel capital to 
locations where the rates of return are relatively higher (and vice 
versa). Two measures of rates of return to capital have been used in 
the literature. The first is a simple differential rate of return that 
may either be inter-country differences in nominal returns (see, 
e.g., Cuddington, 1987; Harrigan, Mavrotas and Yusop, 2000) or real 
returns (see, e.g., Boyce, 1992; Demir, 2004). The second is the 
differential rate of return plus some foreign exchange adjustment 
(see, e.g., Pastor, 1990; Hermes and Lensink, 1992; Vos, 1992). For 
either specification, the empirical evidence is rather mixed. 
Arguably, the second version is the more accurate indicator, as the 
first version may not capture the open-economy effects.  
Among the risk indicators, the variables that are commonly used 
are: overvaluation of foreign exchange, and inflation. An overvalued 
exchange rate raises expectations for a devaluation of the local 
currency. The farther the adjustment is postponed, the stronger the 
expectation will be for the devaluation. Any sign of economic growth 
slowdown will more likely lead to economic instability and drive 
capital out of the country. To measure overvaluation, a black 
market premium (i.e., the ratio of the black market rate to the 
official exchange rate) can be used as indicator. Schineller (1997) 
found a weak but positive linkage between the black market 
premium and capital flight. Among the revolving door papers, none 
uses a black market premium as indicator. 
Inflation is the important risk indicator. Basically, an inflationary 
environment is not attractive to capital. Domestic capital holders 
will convert their domestic assets into foreign assets to avoid losses 
on the value of their capital. Indeed many analysts use inflation as 
an indicator for the overall health of the economy. Most of the 
economic studies on capital flight include inflation among the 
determinants (see, e.g., Hermes and Lensink, 1992; Pastor, 1990; 
Vos, 1992). Among the revolving door papers, only Ndikumana and 
Boyce (2003) used inflation, but they found no statistically 
significant relationship between inflation and capital flight. 
Lastly, we can also interpret the year-to-year flows in capital and 
external debt and their stocks (especially for external debt) as 
indicators of vulnerability. These can be interpreted as risk-related 
indicators. Thus the larger the capital flows become, the greater the 
vulnerability of the domestic economy, especially when the flows 
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are volatile, short-term, and easily reversible. A similar argument 
can be made for external debt.  
 
Political and governance indicators 
Some studies on capital flight include political and governance 
indicators. If there is political instability or uncertainty, the 
economic environment is insecure and capital flees. The capacity of 
institutions to respond to political and economic challenges is 
important as well. Unfortunately, the lack of useful data serves as 
the constraint to quantitatively determine how weak, fragile or 
missing institutions induce capital flight. Meanwhile, the 
conventional analysis is that corruption reduces economic growth 
and investment. Recent studies find that there can be cases of 
economic growth despite corruption (see, e.g., Rock and Bonnett, 
2004). 
Political (or policy) uncertainty appears to have a positive link to 
capital flight (see, e.g., Lensink, Hermes and Murinde, 2000). Direct 
measures of political (or policy) uncertainty have been used, such as 
the number of labour strikes or the election of a left-wing party 
(see, e.g., Fatehi and Gupta, 1992; Gibson and Tskalotos, 1993), 
political crisis or the adoption of structural reform programmes (see, 
e.g., Chipalkatti and Rishi, 2001). Indirect measures have also been 
used such as proxies for political instability (see, e.g., Ndikumana 
and Boyce, 2003), the variance of the foreign exchange rate (e.g., 
Harrigan, Mavrotas and Yusop, 2000), or the level of tourist arrivals 
(see, e.g., Smit and Mocke, 1991). There are market-based 
indicators, too, like the market-risk perception of bankers (see, 
e.g., Collier, Hoeffler and Patillo, 2001). Regardless of the indicator 
used, the empirical results indicate that political risk and policy 
uncertainty are positively linked with capital flight. Among the 
revolving door papers, Boyce (1992), Chipalkatti and Rishi (2001) and 
Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) used political risk indicators, but they 
found a rather weak linkage between these indicators and capital 
flight.  
Lastly, we highlight two important aspects of governance, namely 
economic governance (i.e., macro-level) and corporate governance 
(i.e., micro-level). Each reinforces the other. Weak, fragile or 
missing institutions of governance and administrative capacity 
create vulnerability to speculative attacks and financial and 
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economic crises. Simultaneously, they make an economy incapable, 
even powerless to some extent, of responding to such attacks and 
crises. Thus, as pointed out, financial and economic crises are 
outcomes of a combination of institutional factors, on the one hand, 
and economic policy, on the other. At the micro-level, a similar 
argument can also be made. Weak corporate and financial 
governance create opportunities for private sector misbehaviour and 
mismanagement, including rent-seeking and risky behaviour. Indeed, 
they have all been linked to the recent economic and financial crises 
in Asia (see, e.g., Jomo, 1998; Haggard and McIntyre, 2001). On the 
whole, we argue that weak, fragile or missing governance structures 
and administrative capacity have a positive impact on capital flight. 
Unfortunately, useful indicators are difficult to obtain. Among the 
revolving door papers, none actually uses a governance indicator. 
 
4. Revisiting the Revolving Door 
Incorporating the direct and indirect linkages (Z), the revolving door 
can be presented in the following general functional form: 
(1)  KF = f(CDET, SDET, Z) 
  CDET = f(KF, RES-1, Z) 
where KF stands for capital flight, CDET for net additions to external 
debt, SDET for external debt stock, and RES-1 for lagged of total 
international reserves representing the direct linkages on capital 
flight and external debt, respectively. Z is a vector of variables. The 
general setup consists of simultaneous equations to allow for 
simultaneity in KF and CDET. Only CDET, KF, SDET, and RES are 
specified in Equation 1, but what goes into Z depends on the country 
context.  
Estimates of capital flight from the four Southeast Asian countries 
studied in this paper are discussed in Beja (2006). The rest of the 
data were taken from the International Financial Statistics and the 
World Development Indicators. Data for the political and governance 
indicators were constructed after a review of the economic histories 
of the four Southeast Asian countries.  
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Capital inflows / external debt 
Figures on net additions to external debt (CDET) are used for capital 
inflows (adjusted for the impact of foreign exchange rate 
fluctuations). CDET will be used to test for the fuel linkage on 
capital flight, while the external debt stock (SDET) will be used to 
test for the drive linkage. KF will be used to test for the fuel linkage 
with external debt, while the lagged of total international reserves 
(RES-1) will be used to test for the drive linkage. Note that both SDET 
and RES-1 can also be interpreted as risk indicators due to external 
debt and capital flight, respectively. 
 
Economic performance 
For economic performance, we will use the lagged economic growth 
rates (GROW). For the four Southeast Asian countries we study, 
GROW-1 rather than differential growth rates is arguably more 
appropriate to use simply because the levels of economic 
performance in the region were impressive. From the 1980s until the 
1997–1998 Asian financial and economic crises, the growth rates of 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand were among the highest in the 
world. Thus, there were strong expectations that the robust 
economic performance would continue in the 1990s. The Philippines 
was the exception among the four countries, because its growth was 
intermittent; it also had (historically) failed to sustain high growth 
rates for more than three to four consecutive years. But while the 
Philippines lagged in economic performance compared to the other 
three countries, on average, its growth rate was better than the 
average of the developing world as a whole.  
The lagged of the current account deficit (CAD) can be used as an 
alternative indicator to GROW-1. Note that GROW and CAD are 
positively correlated, especially in the context where economic 
growth is driven by exports that are import-dependent; that is, more 
rapid economic growth is associated with a larger CAD. At the same 
time, CAD-1 can also be interpreted as a risk indicator of the 
sustainability of economic growth in two ways. Firstly, a low CAD-1 
would imply a “lower quality” of economic performance (via the 
performance of the export sector). Secondly, large and 
unsustainable CAD will suggest significant economic adjustments in 
the future, and so it can adversely affect future economic 
performance. Furthermore, when CAD is dominantly financed by 
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capital inflows — hence economic growth is also financed by capital 
inflows — there is greater risk for sudden stops and reversals in 
capital flows, especially in an environment where capital is mobile, 
volatile, and (increasingly) short-term in nature. 
We will not use other indicators for economic performance, such as 
inflation and budget deficits. We take the lead from Ndikumana and 
Boyce (2003) that these indicators would be problematic to use in 
the revolving door model. It is not advisable to use inflation, as most 
of the production inputs are imported. Thus, domestic inflation may 
partly consist of imported inflation. In fact, it is likely that domestic 
inflation is predominantly supply-driven, and not demand-driven 
(the latter reflects robust economic expansion). Using budget deficit 
is also not suggested, as debt servicing can distort government 
expenditure figures. It is particularly problematic when indebted 
countries have some form of automatic appropriations for principal 
and interest payments built into government budgets. On the other 
hand, budget surplus is problematic because governments can have 
(significant) off-budget accounts.  
 
Rates of return and risk 
For the rates of return to capital, we will use either the differential 
rates of return (INT) or the change in differential rates of return 
(CINT), defined as the domestic deposit rate minus the United States 
90-day Treasury bill interest rate. We will not include any 
adjustment for the depreciation of foreign exchange because the 
currencies of the four Southeast Asian countries we study were 
either on managed float, quasi-pegged or, as in the case of Thailand 
before June 1997, fixed. In fact, the currency (or quasi) pegs 
enjoyed such a high degree of credibility during the 1990s that 
exchange rate risk was practically zero. Note that we use INT (or 
CINT) as indirect linkage indicators on both capital flight and 
external debt. A positive INT (or CINT) will lead to a decrease in 
capital flight, but not to an increase in external debt. Note that 
these indicators are risk variables, too. 
We will use the lag of total international reserves (RES) or the 
accumulation of international reserves (CRES) to proxy for the 
foreign exchange risk. A large (discrete) reduction in RES-1 (i.e., a 
large CRES-1) could imply the increased dollarization of domestic 
assets and capital flight, which would be the case during an 
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economic or political crisis. 
 
Politics and governance 
Political and governance indicators are the most difficult to identify. 
For the four Southeast Asian countries, we reviewed country studies 
to be able to identify the appropriate variables to use. To improve 
the precision of our choice of variables, we interviewed key resource 
persons in each of the four countries.  
We will use dummy variables for political and governance indicators. 
In particular, we will test for indirect linkages of financial 
liberalization (D1), banking deregulation (D2), the implementation of 
a distinctive domestic economic policy (D3), and the 1997–1998 Asian 
financial crises (D4) on capital flight and external debt. Note that 
these indicators are indirect political and governance indicators and 
are rough proxies. Data for direct political indicators, such as 
political freedom and civil liberties, do not show sufficient variation 
for each country over time. We expect that direct indicators for 
politics and governance will be not give useful statistical results, 
and so direct indicators were not used. 
 
5. Why Was Capital Fleeing Southeast Asia? 
In this section, the results on the revolving door model as applied to 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand are presented. The 
revolving door specification for Southeast Asia is as follows: 
(2)  KF = α0 + α1 CDET + α2 SDET + α3 KF-i + α4 EP + α5 RR + α6 
Di + e1 
  CDET = β0 + β1 KF + β2 RES-1 + β3 CDET-i + β4 EP + β5 RR + 
β6 Di + e2, 
where EP is an economic performance indicator (i.e., GROW-1 or 
CAD-1); RR stands for the rate of return and risk indicators (i.e., INT 
or CINT); and Di signifies dummy variables (to proxy for other 
exogenous variables): D1 for financial liberalization, D2 for banking 
deregulation, D3 for the implementation of a distinctive domestic 
economic policy, and D4 for the 1997–1998 Asian financial and 
economic crises. Interaction terms in the right-hand side of the 
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specified model are also included. Though rudimentary, the 
interaction terms could capture the overlap between the dummy 
variables and direct linkages or the continued application of an 
economic policy, such as financial liberalization. Fuel linkages mean 
α1 > 0 and β1 > 0, while drive linkages means α2 > 0 and β2 > 0. 
Hysteresis on capital flight means α3 > 0, while on external debt, β3 
> 0. Note that the following are possible: β2 <0 and β3 < 0. The other 
coefficients may be positive or negative, depending on the particular 
indicator used. Stepwise regression was followed; that is, after 
estimating the basic model, the statistically insignificant indicators 
were removed, then the revised model was re-estimated. A Two 
Stage Least Squares procedure was employed to address the 
simultaneity problem. The country results on Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand are presented next.  
 
Determinants of Capital Flight and External Borrowing 
Indonesia 
In the case of Indonesia, the results indicate statistical evidence of 
debt-fuel and debt-driven capital flight, although SDET was found to 
be statistically weak. The coefficient on CDET means that a dollar of 
external borrowing fuels about 94 cents of capital flight each year. 
From an economic point of view, the result on SDET means a further 
3 cents of capital flight driven in subsequent years because of 
increased indebtedness. The total relationship between the external 
debt and capital flight was about one-to-one over the period 1970 to 
2002. Of course, this result is not surprising considering that, among 
the four Southeast Asian countries we study, Indonesia had the 
highest external debt to GDP ratio (see Table 1). On the indirect 
linkages, the results suggest that robust economic performance 
(GROW) was negatively correlated with KF. The results likewise 
suggest that the level of international reserves (RES) and changes in 
interest rate differentials (CINT) were negatively correlated with KF. 
We did not find statistical evidence of capital flight hysteresis. As 
expected, the Asian Crisis (D4) was significant in inducing capital 
flight.  
(12) KF = – 6.47  + 0.94CDET + 0.03SDET– 0.44GROW-1 – 0.12CINT – 
0.24RES-1+ 7.92D4 
                (-3.25)hs   (9.15)hs              (1.35)ws          (-2.48)hs        
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(-1.68)s    (-1.77)s             (2.92)hs 
 CDET = 5.77 + 0.56KF – 0.33RES-1 – 0.24GROW-1 + 0.01INT – 
2.90D2 + 0.39D2KF 
                    (3.82)hs (3.52)hs      (-4.30)hs            (-2.06)vs                   
(0.17)          (-1.85)s        (1.87)s 
 KF : Adj. R2 = 0.89   F-Stat = 43.55   
CDET : Adj. R2 = 0.74    F-Stat = 16.15 
D1=financial liberalization; D2=banking deregulation; D3 = New 
Economic Policy; D4=1997-1998 financial and economic crises. 
Numbers in braces are t-values. Highly significant (hs) = 1 
percent; very significant (vs) =5 percent; significant (s) = 10 
percent; and weakly significant (ws )15-20 percent confidence 
interval.  
Moreover, the results indicate statistical evidence of flight-fuelled 
external borrowing. The coefficient on KF suggests that a dollar of 
capital flight induced about 56 cents of external borrowing each 
year. The results, however, did not reveal flight-driven linkage. On 
the indirect linkages, economic performance (GROW-1) has a 
negative correlation with CDET, suggesting that robust economic 
growth enables Indonesia to rely more on its own domestic resources 
than on external funds. This finding is consistent with the result for 
RES-1, which suggests that a high level of international reserves (due 
to, say, accumulation of foreign exchange as a result of robust 
export revenues) enabled Indonesia to rely less on external funds. 
The result for interest rate differentials (INT) was not statistically 
significant with regard to external borrowing. Of course, as an oil-
producing country, Indonesia can afford to generate capital by 
exploiting this natural resource. The coefficient on banking 
deregulation (D2) showed a negative correlation with CDET, implying 
that less external borrowing was undertaken during the banking 
deregulation period. At first glance, this result appears surprising; 
but on closer review, banking deregulation program shifted the 
borrowing pattern to the domestic sources rather than to external 
sources as Bank Indonesia provided the credit instruments or 
certificates to domestic borrowers. However, the result on the 
interaction of D2 and KF revealed that partly because of capital 
flight (during the same period), there was increased external 
borrowing. Here, a dollar of capital flight resulted in about 39 cents 
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of external borrowing each year during the deregulation period, thus 
a further evidence of the flight-fuelled process. These seemingly 
contradictory results can be rationalized as evidence of capital flows 
dynamics in the context of free capital movements in Indonesia. 
 
Malaysia 
In the case of Malaysia, we found evidence of debt-fuelled capital 
flight. However, there was no debt-driven capital flight. Thus, for 
every dollar of external borrowing, 55 cents of capital flight (debt-
fuelled) was induced each year over the period 1970 to 2002. Among 
the four Southeast Asian countries, Malaysia had the lowest debt-
fuelled capital flight, which is consistent with its external debt to 
GDP ratio (Table 1).  
On the indirect linkages, the results suggest that robust economic 
performance (proxied by CAD-1) was negatively correlated with KF. 
Because Malaysia is a small country, it logically relies on its export 
sector to sustain its robust economic performance. The results also 
suggest that changes in the level of the international reserves were 
negatively correlated with KF. We found statistical evidence that 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) (D3) induced more capital flight, but 
its interaction with CDET was not statistically significant. Indeed, 
this finding confirms the contention of some scholars that the NEP 
(along with its associated programmes) is an important explanation 
for capital flight during the 1970s and 1980s (see, e.g., Jomo, 1990; 
Khoo, 1995, 2000). 
(13) KF = 15.20 + 6.15CDET + 0.03SDET – 0.32 CDET-1 – 0.36INT – 
0.29CRES-1 + 8.69D3  
         (6.15)hs   (4.75)hs       (0.95)          (-2.21)vs             (-0.94)      (-
1.86)s             (4.21)hs 
CDET = – 2.00 + 0.36KF + 0.05RES-1 + 0.45CAD-1 + 2.44 D1 + 5.19D3 – 
1.38 D4KF 
              (-0.74)  (2.41)hs     (0.30)            (4.90)hs          (1.53)ws    
(2.65)hs  (-2.82) hs 
 KF: Adj. R2 = 0.64  F-Stat = 18.77   
CDET: Adj. R2 = 0.68   F-Stat = 12.03 
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D1=financial liberalization; D2=banking deregulation; D3 = New 
Economic Policy; D4=1997-1998 financial and economic crises. 
Numbers in braces are t-values. Highly significant (hs) = 1 
percent; very significant (vs) =5 percent; significant (s) = 10 
percent; and weakly significant (ws )15-20 percent confidence 
interval.  
In the case of Malaysia, we found evidence of flight-fuelled external 
borrowing. That is, each dollar of capital flight induced 36 cents of 
external borrowing each year. The results suggest that there was no 
flight-driven external borrowing.  
For the indirect linkages, robust economic performance (proxied by 
CAD-1) was positively correlated with CDET. As pointed out earlier, 
Malaysia relies heavily on its export sector. But robust economic 
growth (via the export sector) was financed by external borrowing. 
The results suggest that for every dollar of CAD, Malaysia acquired 
about 45 cents of external debt. The level of international reserves 
(proxied by RES-1) was positively correlated with CDET, which 
suggests that larger reserves improve Malaysia’s credit rating so that 
it was able to borrow more.  
The results for the dummy variables are interesting, too. For 
instance, financial liberalization (D1) was positively correlated to 
CDET, which is consistent with what scholars have pointed out: 
access to external funds was closely controlled or monitored by the 
authorities in the late 1980s (e.g., Caprio, Atiyas and Hanson, 1994; 
Caprio, Honohan and Stiglitz, 2001; Hamilton-Hart, 2002). Moreover, 
we found that the dummy for the NEP (D3) had a positive correlation 
with CDET. Again, this finding confirms the earlier analysis of 
scholars that the Malaysian Government resorted to external 
borrowing to finance the NEP and its associated programmes (Jomo, 
1990; Khoo, 1995, 2000). Another interesting result is the interaction 
of D4 and KF, which reveals a negative correlation, which suggests 
that policies implemented during the 1997–1998 Asian financial and 
economic crises (such as capital controls and other counter-cyclical 
policies) reduced capital flight. 
 
The Philippines  
In the case of the Philippines, the results confirm debt-fuelled and 
debt-driven capital flight (although CDET was statistically weak). In 
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fact, the results corroborate the findings of Boyce (1992). However, 
the results here suggest that for each dollar of external borrowing 
induced 40 cents of capital flight (debt-fuelled) in the pre-financial 
liberalization period. The figure increased to about US$1 in the 
liberalization period, implying more avenues for capital to flee 
became available. In addition, an increasing stock of external debt 
further induced an additional 10 cents of capital flight (debt-
driven). Overall, at least 50 cents of external debt ended up as 
capital flight each year, but in the post financial liberalization 
period, about US$1.10 ended up as capital flight each year. The 
results suggest that more capital was flowing out of the country, and 
consequently a hollowing out of the Philippine economy was taking 
place. 
For the indirect linkages, the results suggest that robust economic 
performance (proxied by GROW-1) and the level of international 
reserves (RES-1) were negatively correlated with capital flight. No 
statistical evidence of capital flight hysteresis was found. None of 
the dummy variables and the interaction terms was found to be 
statistically significant, except for the interaction term between 
financial liberalization (D1) and CDET, indicating an additional 60 
cents of capital flight for each dollar of external debt. As pointed 
out above, financial liberalization resulted in more opportunities for 
capital flight.  
(12) KF = -4.22 + 0.40CDET + 0.12SDET – 0.86GROW-1 – 0.60RES-1 + 
0.64CDET*D1              
     (-0.86)    (1.44)ws           (2.38)vs             (-2.38)vs              
(-3.30)hs            (1.73)s 
CDET = -1.79 + 0.68KF + 0.6 RES-1 + 0.3 CAD-1 + 1.0 KF*D2 
   (-0.77)    (3.17)hs      (2.98)hs             (1.76)s                (4.42)hs 
KF: Adj. R2 = 0.40    F-Stat. = 4.46   
CDET: Adj. R2 = 0.55    F-Stat. = 7.68 
D1=financial liberalization; D2=banking deregulation; D3 = New 
Economic Policy; D4=1997-1998 financial and economic crises. 
Numbers in braces are t-values. Highly significant (hs) = 1 
percent; very significant (vs) =5 percent; significant (s) = 10 
percent; and weakly significant (ws )15-20 percent confidence 
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interval.  
Moreover, the results confirm flight-fuelled and flight-driven 
external borrowing. Again, the results corroborate Boyce (1992). In 
this case, the results suggest that each dollar of capital flight 
induced about 70 cents of borrowing each year. The results for the 
flight-driven linkage suggest that a further 60 cents of borrowing. 
Additional flight-fuelled borrowing was revealed by a positive 
correlation between banking deregulation (D2) and KF, which implies 
that banking deregulation interestingly resulted in more external 
borrowing. So, at least US$1.70 of external borrowing was 
undertaken for each dollar of capital flight. Interestingly, there was 
no statistical evidence of external borrowing hysteresis, which may 
be controversial since the Philippines has had a history of borrowing 
to finance debt services. Arguably, the level of international 
reserves (RES-1) can capture this dimension of the political economy 
of debt management in the country. The results indicate that higher 
level of international reserves enabled the Philippines to borrow 
more. 
On the indirect linkages, the results show that economic growth 
performance (proxied by CAD-1) was positively correlated with 
external borrowing. It is not a surprising result since the Philippines 
has had a low level of domestic savings relative to its Southeast 
Asian neighbours. Also, it can be argued that this result is consistent 
with the “twin” deficits argument; that is, budget deficits in the 
Philippines led to larger current account deficits, which in turn were 
financed by external borrowing. 
 
Thailand 
In the case of Thailand, the results confirm debt-fuelled and debt-
driven capital flight, but CDET was found to be statistically weak. 
The results suggest that for each dollar of external borrowing 10 
cents of capital flight was induced each year. A further 10 cents of 
capital flight was also due to external debt accumulation. Therefore 
about 20 cents of capital flight was induced by external borrowing 
each year. 
The results also confirm that robust economic performance (proxied 
by GROW-1) and the level of international reserves (RES-1) were 
negatively correlated with capital flight. No statistical evidence was 
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found for capital flight hysteresis. The dummy variables and their 
interaction terms were not statistically significant except for the 
interaction of the 1997–1998 Asian financial and economic crises (D4) 
and CDET. The results suggest that US$1.10 for every dollar of 
external borrowing ended up as capital flight during the crises. 
Overall, from an economic point of view, 10 cents of external debt 
was fuelling capital flight between 1970 and 2002, except between 
1997 and 1998 when about US$1.20 of external borrowing was 
fuelling capital flight.  
(13) KF = 6.21 + 0.12CDET + 0.11SDET – 0.72GROW-1 – 0.23RES-1 + 
1.09CDET*D4  
             (2.58)hs    (1.34)ws               (2.53)hs           (-6.11)hs                 
(-2.37)vs              (1.77)s 
 CDET = 19.02 + 0.68KF – 0.73RES-1 + 0.31CDET-1 – 0.90GROW-1 
+ 1.61INT*D1 
                   (2.86)vs (1.26)ws        (-3.59)hs            (1.60)s                
(-1.57)s                     (2.54)hs 
 KF: Adj. R2 = 0.78    F-Stat. = 14.53   
CDET: Adj. R2 = 0.40    F-Stat. = 6.93 
D1=financial liberalization; D2=banking deregulation; D4 = New 
Economic Policy; D4=1997-1998 financial and economic crises. 
Numbers in braces are t-values. Highly significant (hs) = 1 
percent; very significant (vs) =5 percent; significant (s) = 10 
percent; and weakly significant (ws )15-20 percent confidence 
interval.  
Moreover, there is evidence of flight-fuelled external borrowing. But 
it is statistically weak. The results suggest that for each dollar of 
capital flight, 70 cents of external borrowing was undertaken. 
However, the results suggest that there was no flight-driven linkage 
in Thailand. In fact, a high level of international reserves (RES-1) 
reduced the demand for external borrowing.  
Lastly, neither the dummy variables nor the interaction terms were 
found to be significant except for the interaction of financial 
liberalization (D1) and interest rate differentials (INT), suggesting 
that financial liberalization resulted in more borrowing and that it 
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was encouraged by the prevailing high domestic interest rates in the 
country. Indeed, a wide interest rate differential prevailed in 
Thailand in the 1990s and can partly explain why the capital account 
(especially private external borrowing) ballooned to alarming levels. 
This result can also be interpreted to mean that financial 
liberalization was not bringing about the anticipated benefits (e.g., 
lower interest rates and competitive financial markets). In fact, the 
result on CDET-1 indicates hysteresis on external borrowing; that is, a 
dollar of previous external debt led to further external borrowing of 
about 30 cents. On the indirect linkages, the results show that 
robust economic performance (proxied by GROW-1) is negatively 
correlated with external borrowing. 
 
6. Some implications of the results 
The above results suggest a need rethink how capital flows impact 
developing countries, as well as a need for decisive progressive 
policy actions. A key element in the rethinking and for action is to 
bring the government back to the centre public policy, especially in 
social regulation and in providing clear vision for development. 
Thus, in the management of the macro economy, it is essential for 
the government to emphasize domestic responsibility in setting 
economic goals. Likewise, it is essential for the government to 
choose policies that reflect domestic characteristics and contexts. 
So it must be embedded in society to be able to effectively respond 
to the domestic challenges; at the same time, autonomous to 
withstand the external challenges that are counter-productive to 
realizing economic growth and development. Thus, putting 
restraints on speculative capital flows, managing external debt, 
monitoring economic activities especially the unproductive ones, 
among others, must be seen as necessary tools of government 
regulation. At the same time, however, the government must also 
promote and enable relationships that support both the macro 
economic and the macro-organization goals. Thus, enabling and 
allowing government-business cooperation and more meaningful 
participation of civil society, among others, are to be expected.  
Furthermore, the results on the indirect linkages suggest the 
importance of sound macro economic management. Countries 
unable to sustain economic growth because of poor macro economic 
policies or uncompetitive economic sectors will discourage domestic 
and foreign investors. This can lead to conditions conducive to 
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capital flight. We therefore argue that there is a need for countries 
to maintain effective control of the direction and management of 
their economies. Because of these macroeconomic linkages, there is 
also a need for a complementary policy mix covering, but not 
limited to, interest rate, exchange rate, and trade. 
The results on the indirect linkages likewise suggest the importance 
of solid macro-organizational foundation. Countries must therefore 
have policies to strengthen the institutional effectiveness of the 
government, covering financial governance and administrative 
capacity. It entails the development of the financial sector through, 
for instance, deepening of banking and capital markets. It is 
important to have a financial system that is able to mobilize funds 
and a capital market that facilitates the transfer of internal and 
external savings to support capital accumulation in the country. In 
addition, it is important to have a robust and competitive real sector 
that produces goods and services both for the domestic and global 
markets, at the same time, production that is progressively 
upgrading on the industrial ladder. 
The results reinforce the importance of effective domestic and 
international involvement and coordination in the management of 
capital flows. If external borrowing flows out as capital flight, and if 
capital surges bring about financial and economic fragility, increased 
risk, or reduced effectiveness of macroeconomic policies, there is a 
need to intervene and institute some form of capital flows 
management and related techniques. The goal for the intervention 
is not to revert to financial repression — it is to regain control over 
macroeconomic policies and the direction of development in 
general. Such tools and related techniques would enable developing 
countries to retain (as well as attract) capital in the domestic 
economy, and to use the capital towards achieving sustained 
economic growth and development. For example, capital 
management techniques can be used to direct capital flows to the 
tradable or productive sectors to bring about sustainable 
industrialization and push the economy to a higher level of 
production; they can also be used to affect the volume and 
composition of capital formation. Indeed, economic deregulation, 
financial liberalization, and globalization, and the processes that go 
with them also imply that the institutions for governance and the 
mechanism for administrative controls and regulations are most 
needed and have to be in place (and should therefore be enhanced) 
in order to realize a smooth adjustment process. This goal is 
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especially important to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand today. 
Finally, on the issue of debt itself, it is important to rethink sound 
domestic management of external debts. The results provide 
statistical grounds for a reexamination of the legitimacy of external 
debts contracted in the past, especially those considered as 
illegitimate or odious debts. In such cases, domestic residents must 
question the legitimacy of external debts and the rationale for 
continuing to honour such debts that society, as a whole, does not 
benefit from. In this case, therefore, progressive actions will mean 
that debt amortizations (at the lease) must be cancelled. 
But the responsibility of governments to ensure that external debts 
benefit the domestic residents – not that they enrich a few 
individuals – remains. A government that misuses funds is itself 
liable for the external debt and must not impose this burden on the 
public. Creditors must also share responsibility in the management 
of external debts through an application of sound lending policies or 
some form of involvement in the effective use or disbursement of 
funds. In cases where external borrowings were actually misused or 
proof cannot be presented to demonstrate that the funds were 
actually used to improve the social conditions of the domestic 
residents, or if borrowed funds cannot be traced, it can be 
concluded that those funds were diverted to line the pockets of a 
few individuals, and more likely, as capital flight. If creditors ignore, 
or pretend not to see, that borrowed funds were used to benefit 
only the elite, or if they do not act to redress the situation, they too 
are accountable for the country’s indebtedness. Then, in this case, 
some form of debt relief should be demanded from the creditors. Or 
alternative debt-relief programmes should be explored by both the 
government and the creditors so that society will now anymore bear 
the adverse consequences of external indebtedness.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter analyzed the reasons why capital was fleeing Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand by employing a revolving 
door model of capital flight. Two kinds of explanations were 
presented: indirect and direct linkages between capital flight and 
external debt. The first explanation posits that there are indirect 
linkages between capital flight and external borrowing, holding that 
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capital flight and external borrowing occur because of exogenous 
factors independent of each other. For example, macroeconomic 
mismanagement creates a risky and uncertain economic 
environment, and capital flight is a response to such conditions. In 
the same fashion, macroeconomic mismanagement creates 
conditions that lead to even more external borrowing. And external 
debt can arise from corruption and related factors. It was pointed 
out that such explanations cannot account for the close year-to-year 
correlation between capital flight and external borrowing. While the 
second explanation posits direct linkages between external 
borrowing (capital inflows) and capital flight, holding that external 
borrowing (capital inflows) provides the fuel and/or motivation for 
capital flight, and vice versa. For instance, external borrowing can 
be transformed from a capital inflow to capital flight that ends up in 
some private account abroad; capital inflows have “liquidity” 
effects. And as external debt accumulates, the mounting burden of 
debt service and the possibility of a default provide a signal for 
increased economic (or country) risk, to which capital holders 
respond by pulling out their capital from the country; thus, total 
external debts have “stock” effects. As capital flight continues, the 
country will experience a reduction in available resources and be 
forced to incur external borrowing to replenish lost funds. Indeed, 
the results confirm the revolving door process: external borrowing 
fuels capital flight and vice versa. In addition, robust economic 
performance reduces capital flight and external borrowing. A similar 
result was seen for international reserves. More interestingly, 
financial liberalization facilitated capital flight and external 
borrowing. Economic and financial crises also induced capital flight. 
But in the context of financial liberalization, even more capital fight 
occurred during economic and financial crises.  
Putting the results together, it can be concluded that the revolving 
door nature of capital flight is a critical dimension to understanding 
how capital scarcity, external indebtedness, and consequently, the 
curtailment of economic growth, affect the sustained development 
of Southeast Asia. But in general, when developing countries are 
already lagging behind on the economic ladder, capital flight pulls 
them further down. This concern also applies to Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand. In a way, capital flight kicks away the 
ladder of economic growth and development. Perhaps it is time to 
revisit the importance of having decisive policies to strengthen 
macroeconomic management and macro-organizational 
fundamentals, and to move away from unfettered capital flows. 
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